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ABSTRACT
Beyond Repetition:  
Karl Kraus’s “Absolute Satire”
Ari Linden
This article reassesses the theoretical import of the Viennese satirist Karl Kraus, 
arguing that his satire challenges conventional understandings of the genre. Most 
notably in The Last Days of Mankind (Die letzten Tage der Menschheit), Kraus’s 
satire delegitimizes any given historical or political position, addressing, rather, 
what he calls “posterity” as the only viable alternative. This moment lies beyond 
the repetitive structures inherent to modernity, specifically as they were articu-
lated in the First World War. Kraus’s “absolute satire” (Hermann Broch) thus 
contains a temporal dimension insofar as its intended audience is one that does 
not yet exist.1
Satire’s Discontents
In a 1974 lecture given in Berlin, Elias Canetti spoke about the Viennese writer Karl 
Kraus’s “process of satire,” which had exerted a significant influence on Canetti’s own 
literary development.2 A prominent satirical author in his own right—and therefore 
one who could speak on the matter with some authority3—Canetti considered Kraus 
a master of the form, situating him among such luminaries as Aristophanes, Juvenal, 
Quevedo, Swift, and Gogol. Yet Canetti had ultimately abandoned Kraus and what 
he called the “murderous substance” of his satire. He explained: “What annoys 
today’s reader of the Fackel,4 . . . is the evenness of assault. Everything happens with 
the same strength, everything is drawn as equally important into one and the same 
language . . . the victim vanishes under the incessant blows, he is long since gone, 
and the fight continues.”5 In criticizing the way that Kraus categorically dismissed 
each one of his “victims” without calibrating the severity of his attacks, Canetti, I 
argue, raises relevant questions regarding the very “substance” of satire and its place 
among other twentieth-century forms of cultural critique. Is there a point at which 
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satirical ridicule goes considerably too far, thus threatening to dissolve into an undif-
ferentiated critique of any conceivable position, much like the Mephistophelian spirit 
“who always negates”?6 Must the satirist therefore confine his invective to this or 
that historical particularity? Or is there a way for satire—which, in contrast to other 
forms of critique, “uses laughter as a weapon, and against a butt that exists outside 
the work”7—to be both limited and yet seemingly endless in scope? What historical 
conditions would produce such a satire, and what form would it take?
More contemporary critics have similarly identified immanent problems threaten-
ing satire’s self-justification. In The Difference Satire Makes, Fredric Bogel writes that 
while satirists “often seem to be devoted to a lucid and purely oppositional single-
mindedness, the shadow of connection is always there.”8 In other words, contrary to 
its own intentions, satire, for Bogel, tends toward collusion, complicity or continuity 
with the object it ridicules and from which it claims to be wholly distinct. Specifi-
cally comparing Kraus’s and Canetti’s satirical oeuvres, Kai Evers points to the often 
unacknowledged complicity between the satirist and his audience.9 Evers writes, 
“because it is invited to identify with the power of his judgment, the Krausian audi-
ence and readership seemed to constitute a community safely grounded on shared 
values.”10 For Evers, Kraus derives his authority from the acquiescence of his audi-
ence and from their mutual agreement on, and submission to a particular system of 
values. Accordingly, Kraus’s satire would hardly transcend the level of “biased satire 
[Tendenzsatire] . . . which is bound to particular aims, loyalties and limitations,”11 if 
these limitations or loyalties could be understood as the system of values that alleg-
edly binds Kraus to his audience, regardless of what these values actually are. The 
very fact that such a “community” has been acknowledged renders Kraus, in Evers’s 
estimation, suspicious. 
In this article I argue that none of these positions alone sufficiently grasps the 
substance of Krausian satire. To arrive at its proper function and telos, I will first look 
at Kraus’s own, and often neglected speculations on satire as he articulates them in 
two of his seminal essays, Heine und die Folgen (Heine and the Consequences) and 
Nestroy und die Nachwelt (Nestroy and Posterity), before analyzing selected scenes 
from Kraus’s dramatic lampoon of the First World War, Die letzten Tage der Mensch-
heit: Tragödie in fünf Akten mit Vorspiel und Epilog (The Last Days of Mankind: 
Tragedy in Five Acts with Prologue and Epilogue).12 By combining immanent critique 
with a theory of repetition, I will show how Kraus’s “absolute satire” (a phrase I bor-
row from Hermann Broch)13 responds to both the various tensions that inhere in the 
satirical form as well as the accusations leveled against Kraus described above: that 
his night is one in which all cows are black (Canetti);14 that the satirist cannot but 
identify with his object of ridicule (Bogel); and that Kraus’s allegedly anachronistic 
and normative satire relies on the “shared values” that bind him to his audience or 
readership (Evers). Ultimately, I argue that the figure of the Nörgler (the Grumbler)—
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who provides a running commentary throughout Die letzten Tage—represents the 
culmination of Krausian satire by refusing to identify with or advocate any given posi-
tion, and pointing, rather, to a quasi-utopian moment beyond the present, a moment 
that paradoxically depends on satire’s illegibility and obsolescence. Such a moment 
is unreadable because it has transcended what Kraus identifies as the constitutive 
problem of modernity: namely, repetition. 
Heine and Nestroy
First published in 1910, Heine und die Folgen exerted a notoriously damaging effect 
on Heine’s reception among a certain stratum of German (and frequently German-
Jewish) intellectuals during the first half of the twentieth century.15 Even recently, 
critics have attacked the essay on two significant fronts: first, for its employment of 
antisemitic rhetoric, which some have interpreted as an expression of Kraus’s “Jew-
ish self-hatred”; and second, for its failure to transcend the very mode of journalism 
that it aims to criticize. Combining this two-pronged criticism, Bernd Witte offers 
this formulation: “With his crude, speculative, and antisemitic literary satire, Kraus 
tries to separate himself from his literary Urvater (Ur-father) and give expression 
to his rage against the sentimental Heine-epigonism in the contemporary feuilleton. 
And thus he succumbs to the same mistakes as those of the journalists he attacks.”16 
While I will address the second of these two objections later on, it is the first that 
warrants immediate attention given the historical significance of antisemitism both 
during and after the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. 
Kraus’s relationship to the assimilated Jewish community in Vienna was ambigu-
ous at best, making it difficult to determine whether his negative remarks vis-à-vis 
German-Jewry are simply the product of his time, or—while unpardonable on any 
grounds—they need to be viewed from within the perspective of his larger cultural 
critique.17 With regard to Heine, one is thus forced to ask if Kraus’s crude and often 
concealed references to Heine’s religion are immaterial to his critique of Heine the 
poet. Kraus claims that his intentions are categorically distinct from those of the 
völkisch, antisemitic cultural critics á la Adolf Bartels, that is, from what he refers 
to as the “narrow-minded hatred of Heine that aims at the Jew” but “accepts the 
poet . . . .”18 Yet while one certainly cannot rely on Kraus’s self-vindication as con-
clusive evidence of his prejudice-free aesthetic judgment, what I would further point 
out in his defense is that one of the presumptions of Habsburg antisemitism (as of 
essentially all modern forms of antisemitism) was that so-called Jewish influence on 
contemporary culture—above all, on the press—was liberal in nature, modern in a bad 
sense, and destructive of ostensibly German values. As I will show, however, Kraus’s 
critique of Heine is predicated precisely on the notion that the latter’s explicit liberal-
ism masked a more fundamental conservatism, that Heine’s aesthetic modernism 
was qualitatively less radical than Goethe’s and Nestroy’s, and that, most importantly, 
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Heine’s attempts at satire did not go far enough in their destructive inclinations. 
Kraus can thus rightfully distinguish his position from that of the Heine admirers 
as well as the detractors because both camps either celebrate or denigrate the very 
features of Heine’s writing that Kraus denies are there in the first place. To be sure: 
one need not endorse Kraus’s conclusions about Heine in particular (and I do not) 
in order to understand his structural critique and the implications it contains for his 
theory of satire.19
According to Kraus, Heine is responsible for having produced what Edward Timms 
calls a “journalistic civilization” in which the distinction between literature and 
reportage had all but vanished, resulting in a form of language—the feuilleton—shorn 
of both the imaginative quality of the former as well as the sober objectivity of the 
latter.20 In many ways, Kraus views the journalist as the most salient representative of 
that insidious feature of modernity that collapses all distinctions into sameness and 
dilutes all substantial thought into the commodified, exchangeable “opinion.”21 In the 
language of the journalist, “everything always suits everything, and the inability to find 
old words is a subtlety if the new ones suit everything.”22 For Kraus, a direct line can 
be drawn from Heine’s language—and specifically the poems published in Das Buch 
der Lieder (The Book of Songs), Heine’s most popular work—to the contemporary 
press’s empty phrase, which is made exclusively for the day.
Kraus then makes a categorical distinction between polemic and satire, arguing 
that Heine’s polemical writings cannot claim the status of true satire because they 
are wedded exclusively to the material circumstances and thus the historical moment 
that occasioned their production, the Stoff (“material”) as Kraus calls it, a condition 
that prevents them from transcending their journalistic essence.23 A polemic speaks to 
this or that particularity, such as Heine’s notorious literary feud with August Graf von 
Platen that dissolved into personal attacks against the latter’s alleged homosexuality, 
but once the immediate moment has passed, its relevance expires and its content 
reveals itself to be empty of lasting significance. And Kraus adds that “whoever mocks 
his rival’s poverty can come up with no better a joke than: Platen’s Oedipus would ‘not 
have been so bitter if the writer had had more to bite on’ [wäre nicht so bissig gewor-
den, wenn der Verfasser mehr zu beißen gehabt hätte]. A bad disposition [Gesinnung] 
can only yield bad jokes.”24 Simply stated, Heine’s polemical-journalistic tendencies 
have, for Kraus, affected (or infected) his satirical sensibility. By so concluding, Kraus 
suggests that satire can be divided into its authentic and its inauthentic iterations. 
The problem is that “Heinism”—especially in its satirical form—has managed to 
produce a generation of “consequences” who repeat Heine’s language and who have 
thereby turned what Kraus believes should have been an exception into the rule: 
mechanically repeatable language that both responds to, and in turn creates events 
that mechanically repeat themselves. In comparing Heine to Goethe, Kraus writes: 
“The poets of humanity produce chaos over and over again; the poets of society sing 
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and lament, bless and blaspheme within the order of the world.”25 By juxtaposing the 
more noble “humanity” with the more parochial “society,” Kraus vents his suspicion 
of a mode of satire that ultimately preserves the standing social and political order 
rather than negating it. Thus in response to the discussions circulating in contem-
porary Vienna about erecting a monument in Heine’s honor, he delivers one of his 
more devastating verdicts:
With all due respect for Heine’s enlightening achievements—so great a satirist 
that he would be considered unworthy of a monument, he was not. Indeed, he was 
such a minor satirist that the stupidity [Dummheit] of his era has borne posterity. 
Certainly, posterity builds a monument for itself that it denies him. But truly it also 
builds the one that it desires for him.26
By ironically supporting the building of this monument, Kraus suggests that his con-
temporaries are unwittingly commemorating exactly what the “minor satirist” Heine 
means for Kraus: namely, the figure who inaugurated the very generation that now 
intends to immortalize him and which Heine himself intended to satirize. A physical 
monument in Heine’s honor is tantamount to an admission that Kraus’s day is merely 
an extension or a repetition of Heine’s own, and not a qualitative improvement upon 
it; accordingly, Kraus sees himself as having inherited Heine’s “consequences.” 
For Kraus, neither Heine’s journalistic satire nor his future admirers is able to 
envision a true Nachwelt or posterity—yet to be defined—evidenced by the “stupidity” 
of Heine’s time that identifies with Heine rather than seeing itself reflected in the 
object of his satire. Blaming his own contemporaries as much as he does Heine, Kraus 
aims to expose the hackneyed satirist whose language repeatedly inspires the same 
ineffectual attempt to critique the very historical moment that it fails to overcome: 
“What lives with the material, dies before the material.”27 The “material,” however, 
remains the same. Heine’s satire fails, in part, because it remains constitutively 
bound to a limited audience and a limited object, which we could link to what Evers 
had earlier called a system of “shared values,” or what Reinhard Merkel labeled 
Tendenzsatire. True satire, Kraus cryptically suggests, lives “with language” and is 
somehow capable of transcending the moment of its conception. 
Two years later Kraus delivered an impassioned speech in front of an audience 
of 1,500 on the Viennese dramatist Johann Nestroy (1801–1862). Nestroy und die 
Nachwelt: Zum 50. Todestage, the scholar Kurt Krolop has argued, is both an hom-
age to Nestroy as well as a treatise on the problem of the satirist as such, “whose 
temporal suffering is a permanent agony.”28 Kraus’s concern is thus with reconciling 
the satirist’s allegedly permanent agony with the demand that he or she respond to 
the contingencies of his or her particular era. To this end, Kraus writes, implicitly 
recalling his essay on Heine:
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How did it come to be that such a spirit was buried: it must have been the great 
content of his satirical thought, and I believe that he continues to poetize. He, 
Johann Nestroy, cannot tolerate that everything that had displeased him remained 
intact. Posterity repeats his text and doesn’t know him . . . it refutes and confirms 
the satire through the immortality of that which is material.29 
Kraus insists that his contemporaries neither understand Nestroy nor embrace the 
satirical poet within him, and because of this, they can only repeat Nestroy’s “text” 
by proving, even fifty years later, to still be the object of his ridicule.30 Nestroy, for 
Kraus, “keeps on writing,” for as long as the seemingly intransigent Stoff of his satire 
persists—petite bourgeois morality, the decaying aristocracy, tenuous conceptions of 
freedom, to name a few of Nestroy’s frequent targets of ridicule—his satires remain 
topical: “This is what Vienna in 1912 looks like,” Kraus asserts, referring to his con-
temporaries: “Reality is a senseless exaggeration of all the details that the satire of 
fifty years ago has left behind.”31 Nestroy had not only anticipated the phenomenon 
of Heinism that Kraus addressed earlier on; he had also superseded Heine’s more 
limited critique.
For Kraus, it is precisely because Nestroy was capable of identifying the historical 
realities that he knew were going to turn into near satires of themselves that they 
became the objects most worthy of ridicule. False satire, to recall, is not capable of 
asserting itself against the moment in which it is conceived and is thus subsumed 
by it unawares.32 Conversely, the distinguishing feature of Nestroy’s satire is that 
it is “full of un-timeliness [Inaktualität], a persistent objection against the topical 
[Zeitgemäßen].”33 Because of its tendency to consistently negate, it is both able to 
transcend the moment of its conception while remaining attuned to the material 
reality that once served as its “occasion” (Anlaß).34 True satire, it seems, writes the 
object of its ridicule to its temporal end, be it a literary form, a political movement, 
or, as we will see, an entire historical epoch. In its grasp, as one critic writes, “the 
present disappears and [is] nothing but mask, historical time.”35 The satirist reveals, 
in other words, the emptiness of the empty phrase, and is able to do this, for Kraus, 
because he or she sees the ruination before everybody else: “It is haunting how reality 
precedes my satire. Shadows cast bodies,” Kraus writes, suggesting that the satirist’s 
language never ridicules the moment as it is, but always in its state of becoming or 
having become.36 Connecting this essay back to Heine, Kraus implies that Nestroy’s 
multiple audiences are always already implicated in his satire: “Satire lives between 
the errors, between the one that stands too close and the one that stands too far from 
it.”37 While Nestroy’s contemporaries (Mitwelt) stood too far from his own satire, 
Kraus’s stand too close to it; but both audiences are addressed by it, while Nestroy’s 
ideal audience, I argue, would be a posterity that does not yet exist. 
And yet an inherent tension informs Kraus’s simultaneous demand that the satirist 
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write against his time, address posterity, and still be able to produce what he calls a 
“transcription of the times” (Abschrift der Zeit)38 without simply repeating the time, 
rendering him indistinguishable from the very mode of repetition that Kraus had 
earlier denounced in Heinism. This tension is partially resolved, I suggest, when 
Kraus highlights the way that Nestroy’s dramas mimic the panoply of voices, inflec-
tions, and dialects that together comprised the language of mid-nineteenth century 
Austria. “What Kraus especially praised in Nestroy’s art of spectacle [Schauspielkunst] 
was the turning into language of cadence. Only the cadence could have an effect 
well after the ephemeral performance of a work by Nestroy.”39 It was not a political 
position or standpoint in Nestroy that explained its ability to withstand the passage of 
time—indeed, Kraus berated the press for identifying in Nestroy the incipient spirit 
of the modern brand of liberalism for which it stood and of which Kraus was highly 
suspicious40—but rather Nestroy’s ability to ventriloquize every voice of his epoch in 
such a way that their ostensible distinctions revealed themselves, in his plays and 
Possen, to be insignificant variants of the one-sided, single voice of social and political 
decay under ridicule: Nestroy as seer and dialectician at once. 
This explains why the object of Kraus’s satire is, too, the language that mediates the 
event rather than the event itself. For Kraus, this is the language of the press, since 
this language serves as the most conspicuous cipher of that condition of modernity 
Kraus laments: repetition without substantial difference. Kraus, by contrast, attempts 
to elevate Nestroy’s method to the dominant principle of his satire: “I prevent the 
tenth repetition of the crime [des Frevels], whenever I repeat it myself.”41 Through his 
unique employment of repetition, soon to be properly unfolded, Kraus claims to put a 
definitive end to the “crime,” to render it, in the words from earlier, dead, historical 
time, emptied of any legitimacy. “As if adopting Kierkegaard’s redefinition of repeti-
tion as a forward-looking counterpart to remembrance, and therefore as something 
new,” Kraus’s intent, writes Gilbert Carr, is to “interrupt a numerical series of abuses 
with their qualitatively new, chastening reprise.”42 Kraus is thus not concerned with 
upholding or recovering a system of values from a bygone era, since his satire does not 
contain a “corrective aim.”43 Through repetition, rather, Kraus immanently critiques 
the Stoff of his time, which, after the outbreak of the First World War, became nearly 
impenetrable: “No idea, whether thought, spoken, or screamed, could be strong 
enough, no prayer ardent enough to penetrate this matter,” he once wrote.44 
Yet how does Kraus ensure that what he calls his satirical transcription cannot be 
subsumed back into the endless series of repetitions that preceded it? How does his 
satire go about negating the material it repeats without thereby identifying too closely 
with it (as in the case of Heine), and ultimately producing an “unwitting tribute” 
to it?45 And if Kraus’s satire accomplishes what it claims to accomplish, how does 
it counter Canetti’s still relevant charge that it reduces everything to one and the 
same language, “and the fight continues”? These are the questions Kraus implicitly 
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addresses in his magnum opus, Die letzten Tage der Menschheit, when he leaves the 
medium of journalism to which his satire had been predominantly confined.
Absolute Satire
By 1914, it was no longer fools who rushed in to Kraus’s head, but veritable madmen. 
The war brought with it a new challenge, and Kraus had to find the proper medium 
with which to confront it, as well as the vitriol “befitting even the world war.”46 He 
opted to oppose the theater of war with what the author and critic Roberto Calasso has 
called a “theater of repetition.”47 In his introduction to the significantly abridged Eng-
lish translation of Die letzten Tage, Franz Mautner describes the drama as beginning
with the voice of a newsboy and end[ing] with that of God. The cry of the newsboy 
resounds in Vienna in June, 1914; the voice of God rings out over a battlefield 
at the end of World War I, at which point the drama transforms into a modern 
Walpurgis Night. From Vienna the drama spreads out over the territory of the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the occupied territories and war zones, and, from 
the third act on, into Germany, and onward, everywhere, wherever the armies and 
merchants of the Central Powers had penetrated.48
Yet Mautner’s description, along with other characterizations of the drama as either 
a “warning play” (Kurt Krolop) or a “post-Christian tragedy” (Edward Timms), is 
partially misleading, for Die letzten Tage, written and published between 1915 and 
1922, resists easy classification and cannot be reduced to what could be called its 
content alone.49 It contains neither images of battle, nor a cohesive narrative structure 
that accords with the timeline of the war, nor an uncomplicated use of eschatologi-
cal language—God’s cry at the end of the text, “I never willed it” (Ich habe es nicht 
gewollt), is a quote from Kaiser Wilhelm II. The drama furthermore does not adhere 
to the formal structure of classical tragedy, explicitly renouncing a tragic hero while 
also placing its own stageability into question:50 “The action, running through a 
hundred scenes and a hundred hells, is improbable, disjointed, and heroless.”51 In 
forgoing any attempt to represent the war, the drama allows its characters to speak 
for themselves, as an estimated half of its lines consist of direct quotations culled 
from actual sources.52 It is a text that indicts, with equal fervor, journalists, politi-
cians, bureaucrats, patriots, doctors, scientists, priests, poets, financiers, optimists, 
and even, as we will see, grumblers. But Die letzten Tage is more than a satire of the 
First World War; it is a thorough and self-reflexive engagement with the very tensions 
immanent in the satirical form that I have described above.
Kraus himself appears only once during the whole drama, or rather, before the 
drama properly begins. Addressing his readers/audience, he writes:
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The staging of this drama . . . is intended for a theater on Mars. Theatergoers of 
this world would not be able to stand it . . . Its humor is merely the self-reproach 
of the one who, of sound mind, did not go insane from the thought of having bore 
witness to these time-things [Zeitdinge]. But apart from the one who exposes the 
ignominy of such complicity to posterity, nobody else can claim a right to this humor. 
May the contemporaries [Mitwelt] who have allowed the things that are written 
here to have actually happened place their right to laugh behind their duty to cry.53
The reference to the god of war is not a mere rhetorical flourish, and this declaration 
defines the satirist’s role as Kraus now conceives it: namely, to serve as a witness on 
the threshold that separates the Mitwelt from the Nachwelt. Kraus’s monologue thus 
takes up where his essay on Nestroy from three years earlier left off, but the stakes 
of satire have risen. For while Nestroy was still able to “laugh metaphysically,”54 the 
humor of this text indexes the satirist’s own implication in “these time-things”—a 
crucial point to which I will later return. Equally significant is Kraus’s suggestion 
that laughter is the byproduct of the satire and not its end goal, thereby renouncing 
a community of laughers.55 
After the monologue comes to an end, Kraus ceases to speak as Kraus and the 
dialogic form takes over, in which “news reports stand up as people.”56 This is a 
crucial move because it enables Kraus to counter the charge of employing the very 
language of journalism he so bitterly rejects, a language that presupposes an identifi-
able authorial voice.57 Within the theatrical medium it is not he who speaks, but the 
press itself that obtains a second life; it becomes clear that it is not journalism as 
such that Kraus undermines, but rather its medium-transcending language that is 
both complicit in producing, as well as a product of the historical conditions under 
scrutiny. Agents of the press were, for Kraus, as culpable for the proliferation of, and 
support for the war as the corrupt generals and militant bureaucrats working for the 
Central Powers, since it was their newspapers that kept the war effort alive. What 
follows is a truncated analysis of the different ways repetition functions as a critical 
force of negation in Die letzten Tage: as quotation without quotation marks, as scenic 
reprise, and, most significantly because it is the most distinguishing feature of the 
text as a whole, through the figure of the Nörgler. 
Kraus once insisted that his “linguistic art consists in the omission of quotation 
marks,”58 and indeed many lines from Die letzten Tage can be traced back to their 
original speakers.59 The celebratory war reportage of Alice Schalek was a frequent 
target of Kraus’s critique of the press, and she is one of the few characters referred 
to by name in the drama.60 In a Fackel gloss entitled “The Schalek advances,”61 Kraus 
reproduces in list form a collection of actual quotations from Schalek’s reports; in 
Die letzten Tage, these quotations are shaped into a dialogue between “the Schalek” 
and an unnamed officer on the southwest front:
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THE SCHALEK: So tell me Lieutenant, if the art of an artist could more intensely 
or passionately create this spectacle? Those that have stayed at home might, 
unmoved, call this war the ignominy of the century—I myself even called it that, 
as long as I sat in the hinterland—those that are here, however, are swept by the 
fever of experience. Isn’t that so, Lieutenant, you’re standing in the middle of the 
war, admit that some of you don’t even want the war to end!
THE OFFICER: No, nobody wants that. In fact, everybody wants the war to end.
(They hear the sough of shots being fired: Ssss ---)
THE SCHALEK: Sss--! That was a grenade.
THE OFFICER: No, that was shrapnel. Can’t you tell the difference?
THE SCHALEK: It is obviously difficult for you to understand that for me the 
timbres [Tonfarben] are not yet distinguishable . . . .62
The apogee of the exchange is Schalek’s admission that she has difficulty distinguish-
ing between the various timbres of battle, thereby alluding to the perilous path that 
leads from mishearing to miswriting. Schalek’s words are also presented here as a 
direct extension of the sounds of war; her imitation of the shrapnel alludes to the 
way she almost reproduces or repeats the war in language, but in such a way that 
aestheticizes its sounds rather than undermines them. In an earlier scene in the 
drama, a fellow reporter is astounded at “the way [Schalek] describes the corpses, 
the details of the smell of decay!” (156), prompting one critic to comment that the 
“original German here is beschreiben, which can mean ‘to describe’ or ‘to write 
upon.’ This particular verb choice appears more than once in reference to Schalek’s 
descriptions of the dead and wounded, and it seems quite likely that Kraus . . . saw 
the connotations of describing a war correspondent like Schalek as writing upon 
corpses.”63 According to this logic, to reproduce Schalek’s own statements in this way 
could be seen as an attempt to revoke the act of “writing upon” corpses and to turn 
this language itself into a corpse, or into dead, historical time.
Corpses are invoked throughout the drama, including in one of the many scenes 
that includes Moriz Benedikt, the editor-in-chief of the Neue Freie Presse from 1908 
until his death in 1920 and a consistent object of ridicule in Die Fackel both before 
and during the war.64 In Scenes 27 and 28 of Act I, the Vatican and the editorial office 
of the NFP appear side by side. From the Vatican intones the voice of the “praying 
Benedikt,” and in the bureaucratic office, that of the “dictating Benedikt.” What these 
figures share in common is a position of influence, a voice heard and respected by 
many, and a namesake. First the Pope pleads:
— — In the holy name of God, our father and lord in heaven, for the sake of the 
blessed blood of Jesus, which was the price of human redemption, we summon 
you, who have been appointed by divine providence to be the ruling powers of the 
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war-fighting nations, to finally bring to an end this horrible murder that has been 
bringing dishonor to Europe for one year. It is the blood of brothers that is being 
spilled onto the land and into the water . . . . (190)
The editor then “dictates,” the semantic ambiguity of the word deliberate:65
— — And the fish, lobsters and spider crabs of the Adriatic have never had it so 
good as they have it now. In the South Adriatic they feasted on almost the entire 
crew of the ‘Leon Gambetta.’ The inhabitants of the Middle Adriatic found their 
sustenance in those Italians that we could no longer save from the vessel ‘Turbine,’ 
and in the North Adriatic the dinner table is sufficiently and consistently set for 
those inhabitants of the sea. (191)66
The contrast between the Pope’s desperate plea for peace and the callousness of the 
press mogul—presented here as a secularized pope—could not be starker, while the 
satire intensifies when we realize that the press’s influence in this regard was visible 
during an earlier conversation between the “Patriot” and the “Subscriber” (to the 
NFP) about the moral superiority of the Austrians vis-à-vis the other warring nations. 
The Subscriber interjects: 
And above all: we’re always human, as opposed to [our enemies]! For example, the 
editorial article in the press had the decency to think about the fish and the sea 
animals in the Adriatic, which’ll now have it good because they’ll be able to feast on 
so many Italian corpses. That, indeed, is humanity carried to the extreme: in these 
trying times to still be thinking of the sea life in the Adriatic when even humans 
have to suffer from starvation! (119) 
Conspicuously absent in the examples above, or in any of the quotations found 
in the drama, is any critical intervention apart from the reader’s own, necessarily 
recalling Walter Benjamin’s juridical-theological theory of quotation as elaborated in 
his 1931 essay “Karl Kraus.” Benjamin writes that quotation, which empties language 
of its subjective intention (“destroyed” or “punished” in his terminology) once it is 
placed into a new context (“saved” or returned to its “origin”), constitutes Kraus’s 
singular critical procedure.67 Reactivating his theory of language from his earlier writ-
ings, Benjamin argues here that Krausian quotation unites the fundamental polarities 
immanent in all “fallen” language: “rhyme” and “name.” Quotation “rhymes” insofar 
as it produces an exact repetition of the quoted language; it rhymes with itself and 
therefore qualifies as the self-referential dimension of language, or that moment which 
draws language inward. In its naming function, by contrast, quotation taps into the 
potential in language to reach beyond its linguistic constitution and establish a relation 
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to the nonlinguistic world. The quotation names the instantiation of language being 
quoted by turning it into a thing of the past: a “ruin.”68 If then, as Werner Hamacher 
suggests, all language in Benjamin’s schema is affected by an “ironic-allegorical” 
character, in that it never means what it says, then Krausian quotation divests it of 
this character by bringing both of these semantic components (rhyme and name) to 
the fore and revealing nothing but their disjunction.69 In this way, the dramatic use of 
quotation, I would suggest, is the apotheosis of immanent critique as it functions in 
Kraus, for by tracing its object completely, it leaves no remainder. Quotation does away 
with the external interpretation that normally mediates the relationship between an 
object of criticism and the critique itself, an interpretation that necessarily implies a 
fixed position from which it derives its authority (recall: Tendenzsatire). In Die letzten 
Tage, the only external move vis-à-vis quotation is the dialogic, performative element 
that summons the quotation to life in each character in order to immediately render 
it “nothing but mask, historical time.” Schalek’s statements, which she herself has 
repeated several times before, are no longer embedded in her own narrative of the 
war, nor even in the fabric of Kraus’s essays from Die Fackel; Moriz Benedikt’s words 
are brought to bear against the Pope’s alone. 
Repetition also functions in Die letzten Tage on the level of its formal structure. 
Scenes indeed repeat one another almost verbatim throughout the entire text, from 
the newsboy yelling variations of “extra, extra!” at the beginning of each act to the 
recurring conversations between the “Patriot” and the “Subscriber.” Krolop has thus 
rightly characterized the internal temporal structure of the play “not as a temporal 
development [Zeitentwicklung], but as time-space [Zeitraum] that is without ‘origin’ 
and without future,” implying that the reprisal of scenes mimics one of the war’s 
most brutal features: its mechanical repetition, an extension of Kraus’s bleak vision 
of modernity.70 The last scene of the Prologue and its reprise in Scene 52, Act V 
provide an illustrative example of this textual practice. The Prologue takes place at 
the funeral of Franz Ferdinand and his wife; those in attendance include the Court 
Councilor Nepalleck, “a delegation of local councils,” two functionaries, a doctor, 
a woman in distress, and of course, an editorial journalist. Every dignitary present 
expresses remorse and tries to justify his or her attendance by insisting on his or her 
own social worth, until the pretense of solemnity is interrupted by the tautological 
utterance of the two council members, Stein and Hein: “Indeed, I know not what 
my business here is, but since I’m now here, here I am now” (64). As the scene pro-
gresses, the attendees’ statements become more and more absurd: the two consuls, for 
example, admit “we indeed do not have any relationship with the recently deceased 
worth mentioning, but we have nevertheless come running here to fulfill our duty,” 
and the presence of the art dealers and book handlers appears equally suspicious. 
As the funeral procession turns to prayer, the scene abruptly ends with the editor 
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(presumably based on the figure of Benedikt) commanding his journalist to report 
on the scene: “Write down how they’re praying!” (60–66).
A near replica of the scene is rehearsed toward the end of the final act, set this 
time at the Nordbahnhof during the last days of the war. The stage direction reads: 
“A train carrying the disabled veterans to be replaced [Austauschinvaliden] has just 
arrived. Bodies on stretchers that are convulsing are being loaded out of the railway 
cars. The stretchers are disposed” (666). The shoal of dignitaries has reappeared, 
each repeating a truncated version of his or her previous reason for having attended 
the funeral of the Archduke and Duchess four years earlier. The minor difference 
is revealed at the very end, when the editor-in-chief, once again, commands his 
journalist to “write down how they’re eavesdropping!”, forming a parallel between the 
disingenuous prayer from earlier and the communicative act of eavesdropping (669). 
The war in nuce appears to be wedged between the two statements of the editor, the 
one that commences the play’s action and the one that signals its imminent end. The 
difference between these two scenes, which cover a span of four years, lies in the 
mere alteration of one word. The scenic reprise in this way mimics the repetition of 
war, foreclosing any possibility of reaching a moment beyond repetition.
This is why the Nörgler, the drama’s resident satirist whose conversations with 
the “Optimist” punctuate the play from beginning to end, plays such a crucial role 
in terms of the structure of the drama: it is the beyond that is his province alone. If, 
to recall, for Bogel, the “shadow of connection” between the satirist and his or her 
object of ridicule informs the structure of satire despite the satirist’s implicit claim to 
the contrary, in the case of the Nörgler, such identification with this object—namely, 
the business of war—as well as with the audience is already presupposed. Oscillating 
between his dual function as commentator on, and participant in the events of the 
drama, the Nörgler can never fully claim to possess the sole, uncontaminated voice 
of reason that less radical forms of satire take as a given. Using a metaphor that 
accurately describes his own predicament, the Nörgler tells the Optimist that it is 
impossible to light a match (let alone a “torch”) when the entire world is burning:
THE OPTIMIST (wants to light a cigarette): Strange, no match is catching fire.
THE GRUMBLER: That’s a result of the ultimatum on Serbia.
THE OPTIMIST: I said that no match is catching fire!
THE GRUMBLER: And I’m saying that’s because we’ve succeeded in setting the 
world ablaze! (658–59)
The Nörgler, I argue, is not simply Kraus, as some critics have suggested, but, rather, 
the drama’s final instance of repetition, as it is he who quotes not only the other figures 
in the drama but also from the Fackel-Kraus’s essays and aphorisms,  rendering Kraus 
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himself a repeatable figure.71 The Nörgler is the last “victim” required in order to 
make the satire absolute; in his own terms, he is merely another “noise” of war despite 
his seeming ability to see through its brutality and from this vantage point derive a 
position of authority. His last monologue is quite telling in this regard:
I have taken the tragedy, which disintegrates into scenes of disintegrating humanity, 
on myself, so that it might be heard by the spirit who takes pity on the victims, even 
though he may have renounced for all time his connection with a human ear. May 
he receive the keynote of this age, the echo of my bloodstained madness, through 
which I share the guilt for these noises.72 May he accept it as redemption!73 (681)
Making a final plea to the “spirit” watching from the temporal beyond, the Nörgler’s 
own tragedy is constituted by his position as a marginal figure who, in refusing to 
purely speculate (or, like the journalist, “describe” the events that transpire), is 
consumed in the end by his satirical method—the “keynote” of the era is the echo of 
his “bloodstained madness,” not the reverse.74 The only difference between him and 
the other figures is that he is conscious of his guilt, whereas they are not: that they 
become sacrifices without ever acknowledging their guilt constitutes their tragedy.75 
It is thus through the split within the Nörgler’s function that all distinctions between 
satirist, audience and object of ridicule ultimately collapse: “because this drama has 
no other hero besides mankind, it has no audience!” (671), he claims, pointing, 
once again, to his implicated Mitwelt. At once engulfed by the war and imitating 
its destructive essence through his own violent language, the Nörgler effectively 
renounces the totality of his historical moment, including the very legitimacy of his 
role in the drama as commentator. 
And yet, the Nörgler’s language often bespeaks a curious admixture of hope and 
despair, evidenced above all in one of his final pledges to posterity: “I am preserving 
documents for an era that will no longer understand them, or will live so far from 
today that it will declare me a forger. Yet no: the time to say this will never come. 
For it will not be” (671). Filled with regret over his impotence in the face of such an 
overwhelming power, the Nörgler still allows for the possibility that in time, his satire 
will be deemed a forgery by an audience that fails to comprehend its contents—here 
the Nörgler speaks as the “aggrieved idealist” about an uncontaminated posterity he 
can only envision.76 Such an imagined temporal beyond, I suggest, conditions and 
anchors the Nörgler’s position; it is the only possible counter image to which he can 
allude, and what it looks like must necessarily remain unspoken.77 But the “yet no” 
(doch nein) in the quote above places this vision once again in check by denying that 
such a moment and its concomitant audience will ever come to be. The Nörgler’s 
greatest fear is that the war and everything it consists of will never end, that his 
Mitwelt, in other words, will never become a Nachwelt. He expresses as much in 
the same scene:
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THE OPTIMIST: But when peace finally comes—
THE GRUMBLER:—then will the war begin!
THE OPTIMIST: Every war has ended by means of a peace.
THE GRUMBLER: Not this one . . . The world will founder, and nobody will know. 
Everything that was yesterday will have been forgotten, that today is, not seen, that 
tomorrow brings, not feared. We will have forgotten that we lost the war, forgotten 
that we began it, forgotten that we waged it. It will, therefore, never come to an 
end. (659)78
Structurally speaking, if the war never ends, neither will the satire.79 The Nörgler’s 
essential paradox thus consists in the fact that he longs for a moment in which his 
satire would be deemed unintelligible, since merely to recognize it means to be some-
how implicated in it. Yet in order to know that one has arrived at such a moment, 
one must also recall the event that had once been the object of satire, since not to 
remember could also be taken as a sign that one has not moved, as it were, beyond 
repetition, that one is still being addressed by the satire in question. A productive if 
unresolved tension in the Nörgler’s function, this predicament makes explicit one of 
the central questions that the drama poses to its interpreters: at what point can the 
Mitwelt rightfully claim that it has become the Nachwelt? Standing at the threshold 
between these two worlds, the Nörgler believes he is writing a text that will never 
end, while he nonetheless hopes to be proven wrong. This is how to best understand 
Helmut Arntzen’s claim that satire is, for the Nörgler, “after its own self-cancellation 
[Aufhebung].”80 
The paradox above is perhaps best illustrated in Act IV, Scene 29, in which the 
Nörgler and the Optimist are discussing an infamous postcard that displays a photo-
graph of the Italian politician, Cesare Battisti, recently hanged, and next to him, his 
gleeful executioners. The photo, it should be noted, also serves as the frontispiece to 
the drama. “For it is not just that he was hanged,” the Nörgler says,
but also that the photograph itself was taken; and it was not just the executioners 
that were photographed, but also those standing by to observe, and yes, even the 
photographers. And the singular effect of our atrocity is now that the enemy’s 
propaganda—which, instead of lying has simply reproduced our truths—do 
not even have to photograph our deeds, because, to its befuddlement, our own 
photographs of our own deeds are already to be found at the scene of the crime . . . 
For it is not simply that [the criminal] killed, nor that he photographed the killing, 
but that he photographed himself along with the killing; and that while taking 
the photograph he photographed himself along with his crime [und daß er sich 
photographierend mitphotographiert hat]—that turns his type into an unfading 
photograph [unvergänglichen Lichtbild] of our culture. As if what we had done 
would not speak for itself! (510)81
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For the Nörgler, the photograph provides an image of the concentric circles of 
ideology fueling the war. At the center stands the deed of execution, which he finds 
reprehensible enough. But even worse are the grinning perpetrators who surround 
the victim; worse than that is their pose for the camera; and worse than that are the 
photograph and the photographer that capture the entire scene—and then there is 
the Nörgler holding the photograph. In one final repetition the image reappears as 
one of the last “apparitions” just prior to the drama’s convulsive epilogue, “Die letzte 
Nacht” (“The last Night”).82 These truths, the Nörgler concludes, are the real lies, 
and their effect is greater than the more conventional lies told by the enemy nations, 
a recurring motif in his monologues throughout the drama. 
But it is also useful to imagine this “unfading” photograph as representing the 
satirist himself, in that it preserves an image for posterity of that which threatens to 
be forgotten.83 The inability to intervene in, or provide a corrective to the madness is 
compensated by the vanishing but nonetheless residual plea that the photograph be 
seen by a future generation. The photo thus reiterates the paradox just elaborated, 
insofar as the true posterity that the Nörgler anticipates would be one for which 
this photograph, too, had become unintelligible; such an audience would under-
stand neither the crime portrayed nor its photographic reproduction, because the 
conditions that perpetually demand to be satirized would have disappeared. For the 
Nörgler, posterity can only emerge once repetition has been brought to an end, once 
the moment being critiqued can be viewed as a singular moment, wholly severed off 
from the moment that succeeds it.84 In this way, the Nörgler’s absolute satire offers 
a critique in whose clutches nobody is absolved. Recalling my opening sentiments, it 
functions by negating the entire language of the present—“for analogous to Adorno’s 
dictum: there is no correct speech amidst falsehood [es gibt kein richtiges Sprechen 
im falschen]”85—if only to show that this language is, indeed, a false one.
At the end of Nestroy und die Nachwelt, Kraus claims for satire a singular status 
among other art forms, since it is “the art that, before all others, survives both itself 
as well as the dead time . . . The satirical artist stands at the end of a development 
that has denied itself to art. He is its product and its hopeless antipode. He organizes 
the escape of spirit before humanity; he is the concentration in reverse [Rückwärts-
konzentrierung]. After him, the deluge.”86 With this, Kraus partially anticipates the 
substance of the “satiric tragedy”87 he began to compose three years later, comprised 
of an apocalyptic deluge of sounds and voices that together constitute the “dead time.” 
But Die letzten Tage takes Kraus’s theory of satire one step further, for in it there 
is no room left even for the satirist to take a stand external to, or at the end of the 
temporal “development” that it envisions, given that the end of such a development 
is precisely what is being placed into question. In its purest form, Kraus’s absolute 
satire has allegiance neither to an audience nor to a predetermined position that would 
claim to be untouched by that which it aims to negate. And yet it does not negate for 
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the sake of negation alone, as Canetti intimated earlier, but is, rather, conditioned 
and driven by the quasi-utopian moment that has yet to come, that is, by posterity, 
which would render absolute satire obsolete.
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